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PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. SUMMUM:
GOVERNMENT SPEECH TAKES CENTER STAGE
EDWARD J. SCHOEN
JOSEPH S. FALCHEK

INTRODUCTION
In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,1 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
city’s decision to display permanent monuments in a public park is a form of
government speech, which is neither subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, nor a form of expression to which public forum
analysis applies.2 This unanimous and quite remarkable decision provides some
clarity about the role government speech plays in First Amendment jurisprudence,
but fails to define government speech or explain whether or not there are any
limitations to governmental invocation of the doctrine.
The purposes of this article are to examine the development of the doctrine of
government speech in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, to scrutinize Pleasant Grove
carefully to ascertain whether it contributes in a meaningful way to the
understanding of government speech, and to illustrate the difficulties created by the
lack of a coherent definition of government speech.
Part I of this article will review the development of the government speech
doctrine in U.S. Supreme Court decisions crossing a wide array of First Amendment
expression. Part II will carefully review Pleasant Grove and the adroit manner in
which the Court disposed of the intersection of government speech, First
Amendment guarantee of free speech, and the public forum analysis. Part III will
examine the challenges presented by the lack of a clear definition of government
speech in resolving First Amendment issues.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
The source of the doctrine of government speech traces to Justice Stewart’s
concurring opinion in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
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Committee,3 in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that neither the First
Amendment nor the public interest standards of the Federal Communications Act
required broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements from the National
Democratic Party and the Business Executives’ Move for Vietnam Peace.4 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart observed that broadcasters should not be
considered communication agents of the government, because to do so would strip
them of all First Amendment protections.5 “The First Amendment,” Justice Stewart
maintained, “protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no
analogous protection on the government.”6 He buttressed this argument with two
propositions: (1) “[g]overnment is not restrained by the First Amendment from
controlling its own expression,” and (2) nothing in the First Amendment prevents the
government from controlling its own expression or that of its agents.7 Justice
Stewart’s observation, then, supports the generally accepted propositions that the
First Amendment protects only private expression from government regulation, and
that government expression is neither protected by nor restrained by the First
Amendment.8
The government speech doctrine was first employed to resolve a First
Amendment challenge in Rust v. Sullivan.9 In Rust, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
a First Amendment attack on regulations issued under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act,10 which provided federal funding for family planning, but prohibited
health care providers from counseling patients about abortions as a method of family
planning, referring patients for abortions, or encouraging abortion as a means of
family planning.11 These regulations attempted to separate the use of federal funding
by family planning clinics from any abortion-related activities.12 If asked questions
about abortions, physicians were required to give one response: Title X “does not
consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning.”13
Claiming these prohibitions violated their First Amendment rights, doctors and
health care counselors challenged the facial validity of the regulations and sought
injunctive and declaratory relief.14 The District Court rejected the constitutional
challenge to the regulations,15 and a panel of the Second Circuit affirmed, ruling the
government has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of speech and the health care

3

Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973).
Id. at 121, 131.
5
Id. at 139.
6
Id.
7
Id. n.7.
8
See generally David Fagundes, State Actors As First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U.L.
REV. 1637 (2006) (exploring the limits to the conventional view and maintaining that First
Amendment protections may be applied to government speech in some settings).
9
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
10
42 U.S.C. 300 – 300(a)-(6); 42 C.F.R. 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
11
42 C.F.R. 58.8(1) and 59.10(a) (1989); Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765.
12
42 C.F.R. 59.9 (1989); Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765.
13
42 C.F.R. 59.8(b)(5) (1989).
14
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766.
15
Id.
4
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workers “remain free to say whatever they wish about abortion outside the Title X
project.”16
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit,17 and
determined that restrictions on communications by health care providers and
counselors about abortion did not violate the First Amendment. The majority
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, decided that the regulations in
question did not constitute viewpoint discrimination,18 but merely reflected the
government’s decision to fund one program to attain certain permissible goals and
not to fund another program which seeks to handle the problem in a different way,19
even if the funded program discourages the attainment of the goals sought by the
unfunded program,20 just as the government’s decision to subsidize one protected
right does not require it to “subsidize analogous counterpart rights.”21 By upholding
the restrictions on counseling, referral, and advocating abortion as a means of family
planning, the Court’s decision significantly protects the right of the government to
engage in speech when implementing a permissible governmental policy without risk
of violating the First Amendment, because it is the government’s own speech which
is neither restrained nor protected by the First Amendment and which trumps the
claims of individuals that government speech violates their First Amendment rights.
The next major decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
government speech was Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va. 22 In
Rosenberger, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia violated
the First Amendment by withholding payment authorization to an outside contractor
for printing a student newspaper promoting Christian values and viewpoints.23 The
newspaper was produced by Wide Awake Productions, a student organization
recognized and sanctioned by the university.24 Under university guidelines,
recognized student organizations were permitted to submit disbursement requests to
pay outside contractors for expenses related to student news, information, and
opinion; however, expenses related to religious activities were excluded from the

16

Id. at 1767.
Id. at 1764.
18
Id. at 1773.
19
Id. “The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so
doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other." Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. In making this determination, the Court relied heavily on Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wash., 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983), in which the Court ruled the Internal
Revenue Service did not violate the First Amendment by denying tax exempt status to a
nonprofit organization engaged in lobbying, because the government is not obligated to
subsidize activities it does not choose to support.
22
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
23
Id. at 845-46.
24
Id. at 825-26.
17
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disbursement request program.25 Wide Awake Publications submitted a disbursement
request to pay its printer $5,862 for the cost of printing its newspaper,26 but the
university denied the request because of the religious perspective of the newspaper.27
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the University of Virginia's refusal to pay
the publication costs of the student newspaper because it promoted Christianity
constituted government-imposed viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment.28 Having established a "limited public forum" for the expression of
various student viewpoints through its disbursement request procedures,29 the
university was prohibited by the First Amendment from excluding Wide Awake
Publications because it advocated a Christian perspective.30 Furthermore, Court
determined the use of student fees to pay publication costs for a student newspaper
promoting a Christian perspective does not violate the Establishment Clause, because
the university's student activities fee, unlike taxes levied for direct support of a
church or group of churches, was "neutral toward religion."31
While Rosenberger determined the university’s disbursement of funds to
support student expression was a limited public forum and upheld the students’ First
Amendment challenge, the decision also included language strongly supportive of
government speech free of First Amendment restraints:
[W]hen the state is the speaker, it may make content-based
choices. When the University determines the content of the
education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is
not expressed when it is the speaker or when it enlists private
entities to convey its own message. In the same vein, in [Rust] we
upheld the government’s prohibition on abortion-related advice
applicable to recipients of federal funds for family planning
counseling. There, the government did not create a program to
encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to
transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. We
recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes. When the government disburses public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate

25

Id. at 824. A “religious activity” was defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief about a deity.” Id. at 825.
26
Id. at 827.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 828-29, 837.
29
Id. at 829.
30
Id. at 830-31. "The Guideline invoked by the University to deny third-party contractor
payments on behalf of [Wide Awake Publications] effects a sweeping restriction on student
thought and student inquiry in the context of University sponsored publications." Id. at 836.
31
Id. at 840, 841.
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and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled
nor distorted by the grantee (citations omitted).32
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,33 the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected a First Amendment facial challenge to criteria employed by NEA and its
advisory panels in reviewing and selecting applications for funding.34 Congress
implemented the criteria in 1990, when it amended the National Foundation on the
Arts and Humanities Act35 to require that NEA funds be awarded on the basis of
“artistic excellence and artistic merit . . . taking into consideration general standards
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”36
Congress mandated the amended criteria in response to a public outcry over NEA’s
funding a retrospective of Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic photographs and
“artist Andres Serrano’s work Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix immersed in
urine.”37
Four artists applied for NEA funding before the revised selection criteria were
enacted. An advisory panel recommended approval of their projects, but the
National Council of the Arts recommended disapproval. The NEA accepted that
recommendation, and notified the four artists they were denied funding.38 The artists
filed suit, requesting the restoration of funding for their proposals and challenging
the funding criteria as impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First
Amendment.39
Initially emphasizing the “heavy burden” imposed on litigants who pursue
facial constitutional challenges,40 the Court accepted NEA’s assurances that the
32

Id. at 833. Rust and Rosenberger appear to have created an interesting polarization of First
Amendment jurisprudence. As one commentator noted:
Rosenberger has now become the standard bearer for one of two poles in
the Court’s government speech jurisprudence. At one pole, the Court
says, when the government makes a decision to create a forum for
individual speech, the government is stuck with it. The government may
not pick and choose among speakers because it prefers some messages
over others. At the opposite pole, represented by [Rust] . . . the Court says
that the government may favor one message over another because the
favored message is the government’s own message, and because the
government has not created any forum for the expression of individual
views.
Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 1377, 1407 (2001).
33
NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)
34
Id. at 573.
35
20 U.S.C. 954-955 (1994).
36
20 U.S.C. 954(d)(1) (1994). NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 576.
37
NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574.
38
Id. at 577.
39
Id. at 578.
40
Id. at 580 (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by
the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. To prevail, respondents must demonstrate a
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funding criteria were merely “hortatory” and that, because no weight was accorded
the criteria in the review process, the NEA was not restricted in selecting funded
projects.41 Taking decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values into
consideration, the Court insisted, does not equip the NEA with “a tool for invidious
viewpoint discrimination.”42 Likewise, the Court noted, the decency and respect
criteria neither silence speakers by threatening censorship nor endanger First
Amendment values, and mere reference to the criteria is insufficient to sustain the
artists’ burden in pursuing a facial challenge.43
Significantly, the Court rejected the artists’ reliance on Rosenberger as
mandating viewpoint neutrality in awarding NEA funds because of the nature of arts
funding.44 The Court observed that, having limited resources, the NEA must employ
a competitive process in screening grant applications and necessarily makes contentbased judgments about the aesthetic value of the application.45 That NEA employs
the challenged criteria in approving some applications and rejecting others does not
constitute a violation of the First Amendment, the Court stated, because under Rust
the decision to fund some programs and not to fund alternative programs does not
constitute viewpoint discrimination. By introducing Rust into the equation, the Court
implicitly equates NEA’s decision to fund some projects and reject funding for
others as government speech employed in the implementation of permissible
governmental policy that is insulated from First Amendment challenge. While it is
not clear what message the government seeks to communicate in selecting some
applications for funding and rejecting others, it is nonetheless government speech,46
which trumps the First Amendment interests of the objecting artists.
In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 47
the U.S. Supreme Court again confronted the government speech/public forum
dichotomy. In Southworth, students enrolled in the University of Wisconsin objected
to paying a mandatory, nonrefundable student services fee that was used in part to
support extracurricular student speech with which they disagreed, and, relying on
cases restricting the use of mandatory union dues and bar association fees for
ideological purposes to which members objected,48 insisted that they be given the
choice not to fund student activities involving political and ideological expression
offensive to their personal beliefs.49 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and decided
that the “First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an
activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the

substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of speech.”)
(citations omitted)
41
Id. at 580-81.
42
Id. at 582.
43
Id. at 583.
44
Id. at 586.
45
Id.
46
See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 32, at 1457-62.
47
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
48
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 97 S. Ct. 1762 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 110 S.
Ct. 2228 (1990).
49
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220-221, 227.
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program is viewpoint neutral.”50 The Court also determined, however, that the
“student referendum mechanism” employed by the University to allocate the student
fees might violate the “viewpoint neutrality principle,” and remanded the matter for
further proceedings.51
In reaching its decision, the Court preliminarily addressed the issue of
government speech when it determined the speech in question was not the speech of
the University.52 The court noted that the government may, without violating the
First Amendment, levy taxes and impose mandatory fees to support its speech,
stating:
It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs
and policies within its constitutional powers but which
nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere
convictions of some of its citizens. The government, as a general
rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other
exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader
principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government
will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and
defend its own policies.53
Just as Rosenberger determined that the University of Virginia’s funding of
student expression constituted a public forum and that the university violated the
principle of viewpoint neutrality in declining to fund the newspaper promoting
Christianity, Southworth found that the University of Wisconsin’s funding of student
organization expression constituted a public forum requiring viewpoint neutrality in
its administration and that the procedure employed to approve the allocations may
have violated that principle. Likewise, both Rosenberger and Southworth contain
dicta supportive of the doctrine of government speech. Unlike Rosenberger’s
upholding the students’ First Amendment claim for funding for their publication,
however, Southworth rejected the students’ First Amendment claim for a refund of

50
Id. at 221, 223 (“When a university requires its students to pay fees to support the
extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer
some viewpoints to others . . . . Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the
student to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program's
operation once the funds have been collected.”).
51
Id. 221, 235 (“[I]t appears that by majority vote of the student body a given RSO may be
funded or defunded. It is unclear to us what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality
in this part of the process. To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations
for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires.
The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same
respect as are majority views. Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon
majoritarian consent. That principle is controlling here. A remand is necessary and
appropriate to resolve this point; and the case in all events must be reexamined in light of the
principles we have discussed.”)
52
Id. at 229.
53
Id.
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student fees used to support student organization expression with which they
disagreed.
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,54 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
mandatory assessment of one dollar per head of cattle sold or imported to finance
market and food science research into the nutritional value of beef and promotional
campaigns to market beef domestically and overseas.55 Two beef producer
associations and several beef ranchers objected to the assessment because the
promotional campaigns focused on beef as a generic product which impeded their
efforts to promote the superiority of American beef, grain-fed beef, or certified
Angus or Hereford beef.56 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that U.S. Department of
Agriculture did not violate the First Amendment rights of beef producers and
ranchers by requiring them to contribute funds to support generic advertisements for
beef,57 because the generic advertisements in question constituted the Government's
own speech.58 The Court reasoned that, by enacting and implementing the beef
marketing program, Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture authored, controlled,
and disseminated the message of the beef promotional program in its entirety.59
Hence, the doctrine of government speech applied and eviscerated the beef
producers' First Amendment objections to the beef assessment program.60 Quite
simply, the generic advertisements in question constituted the Government's own
speech,61 and the beef producers and ranchers have no First Amendment right against
compelled financing of government speech,62 just as other “[citizens] have no First
Amendment right not to fund government speech.”63
Livestock Marketing falls squarely into the Rust camp. Having determined the
expression in question constitutes government speech, the government’s expression
cannot be restrained by other First Amendment considerations and trumps the
competing First Amendment claims of those objecting to the government speech.
Rust restricted health care counselors from discussing abortion with their clients as a
means of family planning and required the counselors to eschew abortion as an
appropriate method of family planning. Because those restrictions constituted
government speech, they trumped the competing First Amendment claims of the
health care counselors. Similarly Livestock Marketing upheld mandatory
contributions to beef promotional campaigns and forced those beef producers to be
associated with marketing promotions to which they objected. Because the
government’s beef marketing program constituted government speech, it trumped the
compelled speech claims of the beef producers.
54

Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
Id. at 2059, 2066.
56
Id. at 2060.
57
Id. at 2066.
58
Id. at 2058
59
Id.
60
Id. at 2066
61
Id. at 2058
62
Id. at 2066. See United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 211-12
(2003) (requiring public libraries receiving federal funding to install internet filtering software
to block obscene material does not violate the First Amendment).
63
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2064.
55
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In Garcetti v. Ceballos,64 Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney in the
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office was advised by a defense attorney
that he would file a motion to challenge a search warrant, because inaccuracies
appeared in an affidavit submitted to obtain a search warrant.65 Ceballos reviewed
the affidavit, inspected the location it described, and determined that the warrant
contained serious misrepresentations.66 Ceballos subsequently spoke to the deputy
sheriff whose averments appeared in the affidavit, and was not satisfied with the
explanations provided.67 Ceballos notified his supervisors of his concerns and
drafted a memorandum in which he recommended that criminal charges in a case be
dropped, because he suspected the deputy sheriff’s averments used to obtain a search
warrant were untrue.68 Ceballos’ superiors rejected his advice, and decided to move
ahead with the case pending the outcome of defense counsel’s motion challenging
the search warrant.69 During the hearing on the motion to challenge the warrant,
Ceballos provided testimony favorable to the defendant, but the court rejected the
challenge to the warrant.70 Ceballos contended that the District Attorney’s office
subsequently engaged in retaliatory conduct for his testifying at the hearing by
demoting him to a trial deputy position, transferring him to another courthouse, and
denying him a promotion.71 Ceballos then pursued a claim for lost wages and
compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for adverse employment actions
committed in retaliation for his engagement in speech protected by the First
Amendment.72
Ruling that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the
contents of the memorandum, because he wrote his memorandum as part of his
official duties, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.73 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, deciding that Ceballos’
actions constituted protected speech under the First Amendment, even though the
speech in question was expressed pursuant to his duties of employment.74
The U.S.Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”75 In reaching this decision,
the Court emphasized that the government as employer can exert control over the

64

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
Id. at 1955.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1956.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1960.
65
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speech the government “has commissioned or created.”76 In other words,
government funded speech is the equivalent of government speech and government
speech is not protected by the First Amendment.77 Hence, because Ceballos’ speech
was required as part of his job responsibilities as a prosecuting attorney and because
Ceballos’ salary was paid by a government agency, he engaged in government
speech and cannot claim First Amendment protection.78
Like Finley and Livestock Marketing, Garcetti falls into the Rust camp. Once
the court determined that the expression in question is government speech, it cannot
be restricted by First Amendment considerations and trumped competing First
Amendment claims. The marketing program in Livestock Marketing was deemed to
be government speech, because Congress and the Secretary of Agriculture authored,
controlled, and disseminated the message of the beef promotional program in its
entirety. It did not matter that it was funded by a mandatory assessment on each
head of cattle sold, because, as noted in Rosenberger, the government may
appropriate funds to convey its message, and, as noted in Southworth, the
government may generate support for it programs by levying taxes on protesting
parties. Having determined the beef marketing program was government speech, it
trumped the competing First Amendment claims of the beef producers.
Similarly, the speech in Garcetti constituted government speech, because the
assistant district attorney conveyed his message as part of his duties as a government
employee and because the government paid his salary for performing those
responsibilities. Having determined Ceballos communications were government
speech, that speech trumped the competing First Amendment claims of Ceballos.

76
Id. citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(“When the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it
is entitled to say what it wishes.”)
77
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (“funds raised by
the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own
policies”). Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. at 2062 (“'Compelled support of
government' -- even those programs of government one does not approve of -- is of course
perfectly constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest. And some government programs
involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position. 'The government, as a general rule, may
support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.
Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be
spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies.' We have
generally assumed, though not yet squarely held, that compelled funding of government
speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”). Legal Serv. Corp. v. Valasquez,
531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in
which the government is itself the speaker”). U.S.v. Am.Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 21112 (requiring public libraries receiving federal funding to install internet filtering software to
block obscene material does not violate the First Amendment).
78
In contrast, in Legal Serv. Corp. v. Valasquez, 531 U.S. at 542, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that an attorney employed by Legal Services engages in private speech when advocating
on behalf of an indigent client. Hence, government restrictions prohibiting legal services
attorneys from challenging the validity of welfare laws infringed on private speech subsidized
by the government, and public forum analysis applied. The legal services attorney’s advocacy
was not deemed to be government speech.
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From its humble beginnings as an explanatory comment in a concurring
opinion, the doctrine of government speech has emerged as a necessary and powerful
tool helping governments govern and coincidentally squelching First Amendment
objections to those governing processes. It is a relatively new theory, which, because
its meaning and limitations have not been defined, and can be both scary and elusive.
II. PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM
The City of Pleasant Grove, Utah, maintained a two and one half acre park
called “Pioneer Park” containing fifteen permanent displays, eleven of which were
donated by private groups.79 The displays were quite varied, and included “an
historic granary, a wishing well, the City's first fire station, a September 11
monument, and a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of
Eagles in 1971.”80 Summum, “a religious organization founded in 1975 and
headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah,” made three separate requests for the
permission of Pleasant Grove City to install a monument containing the “Seven
Aphorisms” of Summum and designed to look similar to the Ten Commandments
monument.81 Pleasant Grove City denied the requests, explaining that it limited
monuments to those that directly related to its history or were donated by groups
with longstanding ties to the community.82
Summum filed an action in federal district court, claiming Pleasant Grove
City violated its First Amendment Rights by displaying the Ten Commandments
monument but refusing to accept the Seven Aphorisms monument, and seeking
injunctive relief directing Pleasant Grove City to permit Summum to erect its
monument in Pioneer Park.83 The district court denied Summum’s request for an
injunction, and Summum appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.84
Applying public forum analysis, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.85
79

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129.
Id.
81
Id. "The Summum church incorporates elements of Gnostic Christianity, teaching that
spiritual knowledge is experiential and that through devotion comes revelation, which
modifies human perceptions, and transfigures the individual. See The Teachings of Summum
are the Teachings of Gnostic Christianity,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/gnosticism.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). Central to
Summum religious belief and practice are the Seven Principles of Creation (the ‘Seven
Aphorisms’), http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
According to Summum doctrine, the Seven Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets
handed down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai. . . . Because Moses believed that the Israelites
were not ready to receive the Aphorisms, he shared them only with a select group of people.
In the Summum Exodus account, Moses then destroyed the original tablets, traveled back to
Mount Sinai, and returned with a second set of tablets containing the Ten Commandments.
See The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2008). Id.
at n. 1 (quoting from the Respondent’s brief).
82
Id. at 1130.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
80
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Having previously ruled that the Ten Commandments display in Pioneer Park was
private not government speech,86 and declaring Pioneer Park to be a public forum,
the Ninth Circuit determined that Pleasant Grove City could not reject the Seven
Aphorisms display without a compelling justification that could not be attained by
more narrowly tailored means.87 Concluding the denial of Summum’s request to
display its monument could not survive the strict scrutiny test, the panel directed
Pleasant Grove City to allow Summum to erect its monument immediately.88
The U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis by describing the role and
importance of government speech and explaining why the First Amendment does not
regulate or restrict government speech. Without government speech, the Court
observed, the government could not function,89 debate and discussion of “issues of
great concern to the public” would be confined to the private sector, and the process
of government would be “radically transformed.” 90 In short, without government
speech, the public would have no understanding of what the government seeks to
accomplish and why. In order to preserve the government’s right to engage in
speech, the First Amendment cannot be permitted to limit government speech.91
Otherwise, the government could be restrained by a “First Amendment heckler”
from expressing its views, and thereby prevented from informing society about the
policies it seeks to adopt or opposes and indeed how it governs.92 In other words, in
the absence of protected government speech, the government cannot govern.93
Further, the Court emphasized, given the critical importance of government speech,
it should make no difference whether the delivery of a “government controlled
message” is facilitated by private sources and resources.94
Having underscored the importance of government speech, the Court
addressed the public forum implications of Pleasant Grove City’s refusal to permit
the erection of the Summum monument. Observing that, because public streets and
parks have traditionally been used for citizens’ assembly, debate, and discussion, the
government’s right to restrict such speech in those locations is significantly
restrained.95 Government restrictions of speech in these traditional public forums are
unconstitutional, unless they meet the strict scrutiny test, under which the restriction
must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest.96 While
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions are permitted, restrictions based on
86
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viewpoint are not.97 These same restrictions on government regulation of speech
also apply to government property, which, while not traditionally considered to be a
public forum, has been designated or permitted to serve as public forum.98
Recognizing the First Amendment intersection of government speech and
public forum presented by Summum’s application to display its monument, the U.S.
Supreme Court quickly concluded that, although it is sometimes difficult to
determine “whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing
a forum for private speech,” “[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property
typically represent government speech.”99 It explained:
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public.
Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected
statutes of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority
and power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other monuments have
been built to commemorate military victories and sacrifices and
other events of civic importance. A monument, by definition, is a
structure that is designed as a means of expression. When a
government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some
feeling in those who see the structure.100
Moreover, the government’s acceptance and display of “privately financed
and donated monuments . . . on government land” are readily recognized by
observers as government speech,101 and throughout the Nation’s history “a great
many” monuments “financed by private funds or donated by private parties” have
adorned federal and state parks, permitting the government to acquire monuments
they otherwise could not have afforded,102 while exercising the right to determine
what monuments will be displayed, what locations are appropriate, and what identity
or message the government seeks to convey.103
So too Pleasant Grove City uses selected monuments to define and control the
identity and image it seeks to convey to Pioneer Park visitors, city residents and the
outside world, and in that process engages in government speech.104 Further,
Pleasant Grove City can do so without engaging in the process advocated by
Summum of identifying, embracing and proclaiming the message it seeks to
convey.105 On the contrary, the city’s display of a monument conveys a message and
that message is not necessarily a single or simple message, but may be interpreted or
97
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understood by observers in multiple ways, just as the display of “the Greco-Roman
mosaic of the word ‘Imagine’ that was donated to New York City's Central Park in
memory of John Lennon” encourages observers to imagine his music if he had not
been killed or perhaps to recall the lyrics of the Lennon song or possibly to picture
the world as described in the lyrics.106 In displaying the selected monument, the city
neither endorses the multiple interpretations people can take from the display nor
yields the right to alter its message by changing the display or adding subsequent
monuments.107 Indeed, because the meaning attributed to a monument can also
change over time, requiring the government to declare its message may mandate a
futile exercise.108
Returning to the collision between government speech exercised by Pleasant
Grove City and the public forum analysis advocated by Summum, the Court aptly
described the important differences between transitory messages delivered, and
permanent monuments displayed, in government parks. In the former situation,
“government-owned property or a government program [is] capable of
accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential
function of the land or the program.”109 In the latter situation, because of the
permanency of monuments and limitations of physical space, public land can
accommodate only a fixed number of monuments. As the court explained:
Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to the end
of their remarks; persons distributing leaflets and carrying signs at
some point tire and go home; monuments, however, endure. They
monopolize the use of the land on which they stand and interfere
permanently with other uses of public space. A public park, over
the years, can provide a soapbox for a very large number of
orators--often, for all who want to speak--but it is hard to imagine
how a public park could be opened up for the installation of
permanent monuments by every person or group wishing to engage
in that form of expression.110
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Nor, the Court emphasized, can the issue be resolved by “content-neutral time,
place and manner restrictions, including the option of a ban on all unattended
displays,” as advocated by Summum.111 Otherwise, the Court explained,
[W]hen France presented the Statute of Liberty to the United States
in 1884, the United States has the option of either (a) declining
France’s offer or (b) accepting the gift, but providing a comparable
location in the harbor of New York for other statues of a similar
size and nature (e.g., a Statute of Autocracy, if one had been
offered by, say, the German Empire or Imperial Russia).112
Indeed, the Court noted, compelling Pleasant Grove City to apply public
forum analysis to public display of monuments would surely result in “an influx of
clutter” or the removal of “longstanding and cherished monuments” and, ultimately,
the refusal to accept any donations of public monuments.113 Surely, the Court
concluded, “where the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”114
Having concluded that the decision of Pleasant Grove City not to display the
Summum monument was government speech and that public forum analysis did not
apply to Pioneer Park, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.115 In doing so, the Court accentuates three government speech principles:
(1) government speech is a critically important tool that shapes debate and discussion
of public issues and informs the public of what the government seeks to accomplish
and why; (2) the government engages in speech when it permits the display of
monuments whether donated or purchased on public property without any
requirement that the government endorse the message the display evokes; and (3) the
government’s display of monuments does not create a public forum in which its role
is restricted to administering content-neutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
The above noted discussion of U.S. Supreme Court decisions underscores the
major challenge in understanding how the government speech doctrine will be
employed in First Amendment cases: creating a cohesive definition of government
speech. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that disparate types of speech
qualify as government speech: restricting health care counselors from suggesting
abortion in discussing family planning (Rust); selecting artists’ grant applications for
funding (Finley); compelling beef producers to subsidize a marketing program to
which they objected (Livestock Marketing); an assistant district attorney’s testimony
and statements prepared in the course of his employment (Ceballos); and selecting
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monuments for display in Pioneer Park (Pleasant Grove). Hence government speech
cannot be defined on the basis of the content of the speech.
Similarly, government speech does not depend its source. In Rust, the source
was administrative regulation permitting the government to select one program over
another to achieve it policy objective. In Finley, the source was a statute altering the
criteria employed in the selection and funding of grant applications. In Livestock
Marketing, the source was a statutorily-based, self-contained, government-sponsored
program to promote the marketing of beef. In Ceballos, the source was a government
employee attempting to fulfill his employment responsibilities. In Pleasant Grove,
the source was the decision of the city to accept monuments for display in a public
park. Hence the source of the speech cannot be said to dictate what constitutes
government speech.
Nor does government speech depend on the purpose of the speech. In Rust,
the government did not want its family planning programs linked to the availability
of abortion as a means of family planning. In Finley, the government did not want to
be associated with the funding of indecent art. In Livestock Marketing, the
government wanted to promote the sales of beef products. In Ceballos, the
government wanted to withhold information about its litigation strategy and
weaknesses. In Pleasant Grove, the city wanted to create an image for the visitors to
Pioneer Park.
Moreover, while the extensive degree of direct editorial control over the
government’s message was an important factor in determining the beef marketing
program in Livestock Marketing was government speech, the degree of editorial
control and its impact in making the expression government speech was not a factor
in the other decisions. Indeed, as the Court stated in Pleasant Grove, government
expression may qualify as government speech even if the government agency does
not formally define, articulate or endorse the meaning it seeks to convey.116
Hence there is a significant void in understanding the application and
limitations of the government speech doctrine. Legal scholars have recommended
different approaches to assess what constitutes government speech. Professors
Benzanson and Buss identify intent and effect as important considerations in
defining government speech: “purposeful action by government, expressing its own
distinct message, which is understood by those who receive it to be government’s
message.”117 Professor Gielow Jacobs recommends that accountability for speaking,
the existence of an identifiable and constitutionally valid message, and the nonspeech-suppressing impact of the message should constitute the framework for
determining the existence of government speech.118 Professor Gia Lee identifies
transparency as the key element in defining government speech, so that “a reasonable
recipient understands that the government bears responsibility for a
communication.”119 Professor Helen Norton identifies the government’s role as the
116

Id. at 1134-35.
Bezanson &Buss, supra note 32, at 1384.
118
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 113 (2002).
119
Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983,
992 (2005).
117

Fall 2010/Schoen & Falchek/17

formal and functional source of the message is the key element in identifying
government speech.120
The lack of a cohesive definition of what constitutes government speech has
caused confusion in the lower courts over what is government speech and what is
private speech in a public forum.121 In ACLU v. Bredesen,122 the Sixth Circuit
upheld a Tennessee decision to issue a “choose life” specialty license plate and reject
the request for a “pro-choice” license plate as a valid exercise of government
speech.123 Tennessee issued the “choose life” license plates pursuant to a statute
authorizing the state to share the sales proceeds with New Life Resources, Inc.,
which designed and promoted sales of the plate.124 New Life Resources’ share of the
profits were dedicated to providing counseling, medical and financial support to
pregnant women, and the state’s share was split between the Tennessee arts
commission and highway fund.125 Pro choice proponents lobbied for the passage of
a statute authorizing the issuance of “pro choice” specialty plates, but that measure
was defeated.126 The American Civil Liberties Union filed suit on behalf of pro
choice organizations challenging the constitutionality of the program under the First
Amendment.127 The court held that Tennessee’s issuance of specialty license plates,
even though facilitated by private volunteers, did not create a public forum and did
not require content neutrality.128
In contrast, in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose,129 the Fourth
Circuit concluded the same license plates constituted a mixture of government and
private expression,130 and upheld a Planned Parenthood’s First Amendment
challenge to South Carolina’s issuance of a “choose life” but not a “pro-choice”
license plate.131 The court determined that the statute authorizing the pro life
specialty plates was adopted because of the State’s agreement with the pro-life
message,132 and, by promoting the pro life viewpoint over the pro choice viewpoint,
improperly engaged in viewpoint discrimination.”133 Fearing that the application of
the government speech doctrine to mixed private and government speech would
120
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constitute an “unwarranted extension of the government speech doctrine and of the
State’s power to promote some viewpoints above others,”134 and concluding the
state’s engagement in specialty license plate promotions constituted a limited public
forum,135 the court ruled that South Carolina’s promotion of the pro-life specialty
license plate violated the First Amendment.136
In Robb v. Hungerbeeler,137 the Eighth Circuit held that the refusal of
Missouri to recognize a Missouri chapter of the Klu Klux Klan as a sponsor in the
state’s Adopt-a-Highway program and to erect a sign acknowledging the chapter’s
participation in the program violated the First Amendment.138 Missouri refused to
admit the chapter to the program, because the statute prohibited participation by any
organization with a “history of violence,” and the chapter is associated with similar
organizations found to have a history of violence.139 The court ruled that the
regulation was unconstitutionally broad, and conceivably could be used to bar
football and hockey teams and labor unions which previously engaged in heated
labor disputes from participation.140 Agreeing with the district court that Missouri’s
Adopt-a- Highway was a limited public forum,141 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
the criteria for participation permitted the state to engage in viewpoint
discrimination, and rejected the state’s argument that the program was government
speech.142
In contrast, in Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. Curators of the University of
Missouri,143 the Eighth Circuit decided that the University of Missouri’s public radio
station did not have to accept and acknowledge financial support from the Klan
under the First Amendment, because the station's underwriting acknowledgments
were government speech.144 The court noted that public forum analysis was
inapplicable to public broadcasting, because “substantial discretion is accorded to
broadcasters with respect to the daily operation of their stations,”145 and that, because
the radio station was required by law to advise its listeners the source of funds
contributed to support its broadcasts, those public announcements were government
speech.146
In a similar vein, the federal district court in South Carolina court upheld a public
school district’s refusal to include pro-voucher promotional materials on the
district’s webpage, which conveyed the school board’s opposition to voucher
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programs.147 The court concluded, “[i]t is beyond doubt that the District's
communication of its own position, as stated in its own words, is government speech,
regardless of whether that communication was disseminated through its website,
email network or newsletters.”148 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
inclusion of links on the school district’s website to other websites and private
parties’ statements did not created a limited public forum, because the defendant
retained sole control over its message when it decided what links and private party
messages to include. Thus, the school district’s speech was government speech and
not a limited public forum which plaintiff was entitled to access.149
In contrast, in Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun
County Library,150 the federal district court ruled that the public library created a
limited public forum when it provided access to the internet through its computers to
members of the public.151 In reaching its decision, the court considered three factors:
government intent, government designation, and the nature of the forum. Because
the county government intended to create a public forum when it authorized its
public library system and designated the library for the use of the public, and because
the internet is compatible with facilitating expressive communication, the court
determined that public library access to the internet constituted a limited public
forum.152
The above described confusion in the lower courts as to what is government
speech, mixed private and government speech, or private speech in a public forum
underscores the need for a coherent definition of government speech. As Professor
Helen Norton noted, “[c]onflicts like these illustrate the need for a coherent
government speech doctrine that parses the government’s impermissible censorship
of private speech from its own legitimate expressive interests.”153
Even more worrisome, the lack of a cohesive definition of government speech
has triggered the application of the government speech doctrine to faculty members
in public supported universities. While the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Ceballos
that the government speech doctrine may have an effect on academic freedom and
declined to indicate how the doctrine would affect scholarship or teaching,154 lower
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courts have applied Ceballos to university professors. In Renken v. Gregory,155
Kevin Renken, a tenured Professor of Engineering, claimed the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee reduced his pay and terminated his National Science
Foundation (NSF) grant in retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment rights
in complaining about the University’s use of NSF grant funds. Professor Renken
pursued an action against the University under 43 U.S.C. § 1983.156 Concluding
Renken’s comments were made as part of his official duties as a professor rather
than as a private citizen, the district court granted the University’s motion for
summary judgment.157 The Sixth Circuit agreed, ruling that, because Renken
complained about the University’s use of the NSF funds “pursuant to his official
duties as a University professor, his speech was not shielded by the First
Amendment.”158
Similarly, in Gorum v. Sessoms,159 Allen Sessoms, the president of Delaware
State University, fired a tenured professor, Wendell Gorum, for improperly changing
forty-eight students’ failing grades to passing grades.160 Professor Gorum pursued an
action against the University for wrongful dismissal, claiming that the University
committee which investigated the matter recommended he be suspended not
dismissed and that the university president acted in retaliation for his exercise of his
First Amendment rights in voicing opposition to Sessoms’ selection as president, in
objecting to disciplinary action taken against a student athlete, and in rescinding the
invitation to Sessoms to address a fraternity’s Martin Luther King, Jr. Prayer
Breakfast.161 The district court rejected Gorum’s claims, concluding his three
speech-related claims occurred within the scope of his duties as a university
professor and were not protected by the First Amendment.162 The Third Circuit
affirmed, ruling the speech in question was undertaken as part of his professional
duties rather than as a private citizen, and hence was not protected by the First
Amendment.163
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As a consequence of these decisions, the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) initiated a campaign to protect the academic freedom in public
colleges and universities and to promote the adoption of “policies broadly protecting
faculty speech dealing with academic matters, institutional governance, teaching,
research, and issues outside the workplace.”164 The AAUP also issued a report
expressing alarm at recent federal court decisions which ominously threaten
academic freedom and insisting on the restoration of the deference traditionally
rendered to speech within the academic setting.165
CONCLUSION
While Pleasant Grove enhances our understanding of the role of government
speech by upholding the right of city officials to accept donations of monuments for
display in public parks and thereby craft the image they wish to present to the
visiting public without fear of violating the First Amendment, the Pleasant Grove
decision, like its antecedents, fails to address the critically important need to craft a
workable definition of government speech. Even though the development of the
government speech doctrine in First Amendment cases is in its infancy, the difficulty
in distinguishing between private and government speech, between the government’s
establishment of public speech forums and the government’s engagement in
communicating its own speech, and between those situations in which the
government must maintain viewpoint neutrality or may engage in its own
propaganda, points to the need to focus judicial attention on the development of a
more cohesive definition of government speech.
What is clear is that, when invoked, government speech trumps competing
First Amendment claims, freeing the government to pursue the art of governing by
164
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informing the public of what it seeks to accomplish and why. What is far less clear
is exactly what constitutes government speech. While legal scholars have
recommended that factors such as authorship, purpose, nature, speaker identity, and
control are determinative in deciding whether or not the speech in question is
government speech, it is unclear which of those factors should be applied and the
weight to be accorded them. Because these issues are unresolved, lower courts
struggle to resolve what qualifies as government speech. Even more ominously,
lower courts have begun to apply the doctrine of government speech to university
professors by determining that their publicly stated criticisms of the university are
undertaken as part of their official duties as state employees and do not constitute
private speech under the First Amendment. None of the lower court decisions
discussed above having been appealed, time and future litigation may tell.
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